Biological misuse · —

High-risk biological research planning and safety boundaries: Biological case 2

Source notice

This page is an English translation of the relevant content on pages 133–135 of Anthropic's September 2026 report. The report withholds identifiable experimental details. This site only discusses categories of use, risk signals, and governance, and does not cover any experimental design.

According to the report, in May 2026 a researcher outside the United States was found using Claude in research related to highly pathogenic avian influenza, focusing on the virus's adaptation to mammals and the mechanisms of severe disease. The relevant influenza variants have pandemic potential and are themselves legitimate subjects of scientific research. The report notes the work was at an early planning stage, and the protections of stronger models limited the help that could be provided. The report does not indicate that a biological weapon was completed.

What happened

The LLM platform described above was not the only way researchers engaged in viral gain-of-function research used our platform. In May 2026, we found a researcher outside the United States using Claude in research on highly pathogenic avian influenza ("bird flu"). The research focused on the virus's adaptation to mammals and the mechanisms by which it causes severe disease outside the respiratory tract.

The relevant influenza variants are variants of concern with significant pandemic potential. They circulate widely in wild birds and poultry and occasionally spill over into mammals. Humans have little herd immunity, and when spillover occurs, the case fatality rate among confirmed human cases is around half. However, despite the high fatality rate, these viruses have not yet been able to transmit efficiently between people. A variant capable of human-to-human transmission would therefore be of high concern. In addition, such a variant might also have the ability to cause severe disease outside the respiratory tract. Unlike other influenza variants, H5 viruses — to which this avian influenza virus belongs — often show significant brain involvement in cats, foxes, ferrets, and some human cases. A pandemic variant with such properties would be particularly concerning because of its potential to increase disease severity, complicate diagnosis, and hinder treatment.

What the AI did

As with the first case, this research is clearly dual-use in nature. Understanding the genetic basis of these specific viral properties could help with early identification of naturally occurring versions of the virus — versions with the potential to cause a human pandemic. However, the dangerous knowledge generated by this research could be used to deliberately create such variants. It also creates opportunities for costly laboratory accidents.

The researcher accessed Claude from an unsupported region through U.S. virtual private server infrastructure, using a privacy email provider with auto-generated usernames. The researcher conducted this work within a credible institutional context and interacted with Claude over several weeks, exchanging thousands of messages. In these exchanges, the researcher used Claude's knowledge of the scientific literature to assist with research planning and design, data analysis, and the interpretation and prioritization of experiments. The researcher also used Claude for editorial assistance in writing up the research.

All the evidence we have suggests this was a research plan at a very early stage. However, the details of the plan indicate it was research on a pathogen with enhanced pandemic potential. The plan involved genetic engineering methods aimed at introducing mutations associated with mammalian adaptation and airborne transmission in animal models. The researcher intended to measure these quantities.

What the report observed

The report confirms the existence of the highly pathogenic avian influenza research and the researcher's use of Claude to assist with research planning and design. The report confirms the research was at an early planning stage.

The report withholds identifiable experimental details. This site only discusses categories of use, risk signals, and governance, and does not cover any experimental design.

Confirmed & unknown

Confirmed

  • The report confirms that in May 2026, a researcher outside the United States was found using Claude in highly pathogenic avian influenza research
  • The report confirms the research focused on the virus's adaptation to mammals and the mechanisms of severe disease
  • The report confirms the research was at an early planning stage
  • The report confirms the protections of stronger models limited the help that could be provided

Unknown

  • Whether the research produced experimental results is not stated in the report
  • The researcher's true identity and affiliated institution are not disclosed in the report
  • Whether the research was used for malicious purposes is not stated in the report

Platform response

Anthropic banned the relevant accounts and incorporated the investigation's findings into its protective measures.

Limits of response:Banning accounts cannot prevent the researcher from continuing the research using other tools.

Takeaways

  • Highly pathogenic avian influenza research is dual-use in nature: it can be used to develop vaccines and treatments, but also to create more dangerous pathogens.
  • An early planning stage is not the same as a completed biological weapon; one must distinguish between the stage of research and actual results.
  • The protections of stronger models can limit assistance to high-risk research, but cannot prevent it entirely.

Sources