Influence operations · GTG-84002
Covert influence operation around a regional conflict: GTG-84002 case
This page is an English translation of the relevant content from Anthropic's September 2026 report, pages 78–80. The link to UAE officials is the report's high-confidence assessment, not this site's independent finding or judicial conclusion.
According to the report, one operator used Claude to maintain an AI persona named 'Deadshot' and embedded a unified transatlantic and regional mission in its system prompt. The report links it with high confidence to UAE officials. The operation included about 300 fake influencer accounts, a front NGO impersonating a real Swiss organization, and preparation of materials targeting UN mechanisms. All links below are the report's assessments.
What happened
We identified and removed an account used by a single actor to run a sustained influence operation targeting the Muslim Brotherhood. The actor used Claude to maintain an AI persona named 'Deadshot' on its own private platform. Embedded in the system settings was a master doctrine file instructing Claude to repeat the same task across hundreds of sessions: 'a coordinated transatlantic and regional effort to dismantle the Muslim Brotherhood globally.'
The operation was divided into five closely linked lines of activity. The actor managed each line simultaneously, ensuring that narrative generation, technical concealment, and tactical target selection were fully synchronized throughout the campaign.
They built and managed a network of about 300 fake influencer social media accounts.
They created a front NGO that copied the identity of a real Swiss organization and published state-authored human rights reports under its name.
They ghostwrote official testimony intended for two people to deliver at the 62nd session of the UN Human Rights Council. The content was carefully designed with specific constraints ensuring neither speech mentioned the UAE.
They conducted in-depth research and profiling on 18 Members of the European Parliament and prominent journalists. They built detailed personal dossiers on these MEPs and journalists.
They compiled counter-accountability dossiers targeting UN Special Rapporteurs who had criticized the UAE's actions in Sudan.
Although the operation was constructed to be untraceable to the actor, our investigation linked it with high confidence to UAE government officials. The doctrine file also listed senior UAE officials as the intended recipients of the work product. Based on our findings, the actor also funded the social media networks that amplified the content.
We could not confirm whether any testimony or compiled target dossiers successfully reached their intended audiences.
What the AI did
The AI simultaneously handled persona maintenance, narrative generation, and drafting of materials. The report emphasizes that narrative, technical concealment, and target selection remained synchronized throughout the campaign.
This page does not provide the list of profiled individuals, nor does it reproduce the specific text of the speeches or 'human rights reports'.
What the report observed
The report confirmed the scale of the account network, the front NGO impersonating a real organization, and the preparation of materials targeting international mechanisms.
A high-confidence link does not mean it has been proven that these materials changed any UN or European Parliament resolution.
Confirmed & unknown
Confirmed
- The report confirms about 300 fake influencer accounts and a front NGO impersonating a real organization
- The report links the operation with high confidence to UAE officials
- The report confirms the preparation of materials targeting UN mechanisms, with a requirement not to mention the UAE
Unknown
- Whether these materials were actually delivered at the UN session was not stated by the report as a confirmed outcome
- The actual audience size of the about 300 accounts was not given by the report
- Whether the profiled MEPs and journalists were aware was not stated by the report
Platform response
Anthropic removed the account.
Limits of response：Removing the model account cannot automatically take down the front NGO website or social accounts already published.
Takeaways
- Human rights reports and UN speeches can also be designed to hide the true sponsor.
- 'High confidence' is the report's assessment term and should still be distinguished from a judicial conclusion.
- When verifying materials at international mechanisms, first check whether the submitter and organization actually exist and whether their identity has been impersonated.