This chapter's six units are split into two groups: weapons development and design, and intelligence collection and procurement. Documents and simulations are not deployment.
p. 111–128 · 6 case units
Key findings
Read in this order: intended use, progress, unknowns, governance implications.
GTG-27005 is mainly simulation-based, and its funding links include unverified self-reports.
The mention counts in GTG-17002's figure are not performance metrics.
What happened
Original report pages 111–128. GTG-87001 discusses AI use in guided-weapon software; followed by underwater weapon documents, drone swarm simulation, electronic warfare analysis software, dual-use procurement, and open-source intelligence on directed-energy weapons.
Public articles do not become tutorials: no parameters, specifications, strike targets, or routes for evading trade restrictions are provided.
Original report illustration: schematic of the work stages in this chapter. Text in the figure is the original English.
According to the report, a China-linked actor used Claude to advance three parallel document workstreams for an anti-torpedo weapons system: a Chinese-language specification, a technical proposal of over 200 pages, and a comparison briefing against US programs based on public sources. The actor claimed to be a US defense OEM; the report assesses it to be linked to China's defense industry. This page distinguishes document generation from actual weapons deployment and does not publish any technical specifications.
According to the report, a Chinese actor used Claude's chat, coding, and agent work tools to design, build, and iterate on a Chinese-language electronic warfare software suite of about 16 modules, used to detect, jam, or spoof adversary radars and communications, and to suppress adversary air defense systems. The software analyzes adversary radars, air defense missile sites, command posts, and communication nodes, calculates their detection coverage, assesses jamming effectiveness, ranks targets by value and vulnerability, and determines how to best allocate jamming sorties. This page does not publish any target coordinates or software logic.
According to the report, a threat actor based in China used Claude to collect open-source intelligence on advanced directed energy weapons, edit intelligence products, and draft Chinese-language briefings. The actor claimed to be a defense intelligence writer and internal publication editor, leading a three-person team. The actor attempted to identify a specific microwave-generating device and its supplier through iterative probability-weighted attribution, with the goal of reverse-engineering the weapon, developing countermeasures, and benchmarking it against Chinese systems. This page does not publish any weapons parameters or supply chain details.
According to the report, a freelancer likely based in Russia used Claude Code to write suicide drone swarm software called DronDoc / Serafim, and tested it in software-in-the-loop simulation, rented compute resources, and development boards. The report observed real hardware-in-the-loop testing, but overall the activity remained focused on simulation and development. Some funding connections are the actor's own unverified claims. This cannot be presented as established operational capability.
According to the report, an actor based in Russia used Claude to research and draft procurement documents for goods that can be used for both civilian and military purposes, potentially for Russian government and defense industry clients. At the center of the operation was a person claiming to be a procurement manager at a Moscow design bureau. The procurement involved German-made three-axis fluxgate magnetometers, thousands of space-grade photovoltaic wafers, aviation crew oxygen systems, and more. This page does not publish any supplier information or procurement details.
According to the report, a threat actor group in northern Yemen ran three weapons development programs: a guided rocket with terminal homing using commodity phone-grade flight computers, a multistage ballistic missile claiming a range of over 2,000 km, and the 'R2000' series of multi-variant missiles including a hypersonic glide vehicle variant. The actors used Claude Code in place of human software engineers to develop guidance, navigation, and control (GNC) software. The actors conducted a guided rocket test launch, which appears to have failed. This page does not publish any weapons software code or parameters.
Limits of response
Self-reported customers and funders are always marked as unverified unless the report states higher confidence.
Content in this chapter must omit operational details per the high-risk template.
