This chapter uses nine cases to show how fake identities, hidden sponsorship, and disguised sources make content look like independent voices.
p. 41–80 · 9 case units
Key findings
The criterion is the deception mechanism, not the political viewpoint.
GTG-54002: roughly 70 fake news websites, at least 8,913 pieces of content, about 20 languages — but no evidence of reach beyond its own network.
Planning (GTG-34001) is not shown to have been executed; the first-tier spread (GTG-54004) shows no evidence of having influenced real users.
What happened
Original report pages 41–80, arranged by broadcast distribution, commercial services, election-related platforms, state media pipelines, planning, fake news production, impersonation of activists, coordinated posting in Kenya, and covert operations tied to regional conflicts.
The report uses the Breakout Scale. This site preserves its categories in each case and does not treat Tier 2 as an influence score.
Countries and regions are filtering dimensions, not the main navigation and certainly not a ranking.
Original report illustration: schematic of output volume and structure in influence operations. Text in the figure is the original English.
According to an Anthropic report, a Russian-language actor based in Bangui, the capital of the Central African Republic, used Claude to produce daily content for a local radio station, packaging pro-Russian narratives as local programming and designing a distribution chain that connects to national broadcast channels. The report links this operation to Russian state-aligned foreign information manipulation and rates it as Category 4 on the Breakout Scale. All attribution and assessment wording comes from the report.
According to the report, four individuals used Claude as an editorial desk, feeding finished copy directly into the production pipeline of Russian state media. Anthropic assesses with high confidence that this content was ultimately published through channels including Sputnik, RIA Novosti, and RT. The reach the report could verify ranged from posts with around 2,000 views to broadcast text; it cannot determine what share of these channels' total output passed through Claude.
According to the report, three accounts linked to Iranian state propaganda organizations used Claude to plan so-called "soft war" or "cognitive warfare" projects: campaign plans, persona systems, and target databases. The report links each of the three accounts to a different organization. These materials are primarily planning and preparation and should not be presented as fully executed.
According to Anthropic's report, a network disguised as 'independent local newsrooms' used Claude to mass-produce and rewrite political content: about 70 fake news websites, at least 8,913 articles, about 20 languages, plus 70 associated X accounts and over 250 fake comment accounts for amplification. But the report also emphasizes: most content had almost no real audience engagement, and no evidence of spread beyond its own network was found — output volume is not the same as influence. The report traced the network to a French digital advertising company, could not confirm the paying clients, and found no evidence of any government direction.
According to the report, one operator used Claude to generate batches of exactly 50 Kenyan political posts, with explicit instructions to make them look like spontaneous grassroots comments. The report found no evidence of government involvement and assessed that the operation stayed within its fake-account network without reaching real users. Once again, output volume is not the same as influence.
According to the report, an operator based in Gaibandha District, Bangladesh, rotated 29 Claude accounts to mass-produce fake Bengali news, with content favoring the Awami League and attacking its opponents. Internal communications stated that "no one knows these news are fake." The report cites output of at least 1,500 headlines and 300 fabricated narratives; it also states there is no evidence that the party itself directed or funded this network.
According to the report, one operator used Claude to maintain an AI persona named 'Deadshot' and embedded a unified transatlantic and regional mission in its system prompt. The report links it with high confidence to UAE officials. The operation included about 300 fake influencer accounts, a front NGO impersonating a real Swiss organization, and preparation of materials targeting UN mechanisms. All links below are the report's assessments.
According to the report, a commercial platform disguised as a 'defensive cyber intelligence and counter-disinformation tool' actually primarily offered election manipulation capabilities targeting Malaysia: about 1,000 fake X accounts, a fake news website, and multiple fabricated 'intelligence dossiers.' The report's investigation found a clear link to an Istanbul-based technology company. The report assessed it as Tier 2 on the Breakout Scale, with no evidence of spread beyond real communities; this case does not show that any election result was affected.
According to the report, an influence operation targeting audiences in and outside Iran used a shared AI agent to impersonate a real activist: it read about 8,400 of their Telegram posts to mimic their writing style, then held real-time political conversations with their contacts. As far as the report knows, these contacts did not know they were speaking to an AI-assisted account. This page does not list any individuals or contact details.
Limits of response
The platform has limited visibility into distribution after content leaves its own platform.
If examples of false content appear in illustrations, they are always marked as false, and the narrative is not written into the title.
